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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Defense (DoD) does not have a defined cybersecurity 
operational risk management process for unmanned aerial systems (UASs). The DoD 
acknowledged this discrepancy and suspended all commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
UASs on 23 May 2018. The suspension was followed by a rigid DoD COTS UAS waiver 
process effective 01 June 2018. COTS UASs are defined by the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Memorandum using three different criteria: UASs sold in the same form to the 
public and government, those commercially available systems that have software and/or 
hardware modifications, and those with specific ground command and control elements, 
such as smart devices and tablets. 
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities can span the acquisition, strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels. This research focused on the tactical level. Tactical commanders often 
lack the tools to identify and mitigate UAS cybersecurity vulnerabilities. This effort 
leveraged the standards developed by the National Institute of Science and Technology 
drafted Federal Information Processing Standards and Special Publication 800 series to 
develop the proposed UAS Cybersecurity Risk Management Decision Matrix. The matrix 
can enable tactical commanders to conduct a cybersecurity risk determination for UAS 
operators. This mitigates risk and strengthens strategic and operational decisions. 
Furthermore, three recommendations for future work are offered which will improve the 
UAS cybersecurity processes within the DoD. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2011, a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel was commandeered, while in flight, by 
an Iranian cyber warfare specialist [1]. The event proved that capable threats exist and 
adversaries are actively working to exploit critical vulnerabilities in U.S. unmanned 
systems. This is an example of an event that should not have happened and this thesis 
develops a core process that provides tactical units with the capability to incorporate 
cybersecurity risk assessments that should mitigate the risk from such attacks in the future. 
In the Department of Defense (DoD) the term “cybersecurity” is defined as a “prevention 
of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications 
systems, electronic communications services, wire communications, and electronic 
communications, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation” [2]. Systematic UAS 
cybersecurity assessments that consider system confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
will provide the foundation for a tool that will minimize the likelihood of future incidents 
similar to the 2011 RQ-170 event and mitigate the consequences when such attacks are 
attempted. 
Threats to cybersecurity are prevalent on a global scale and wreak havoc in many 
different domains. The Internet, including the myriad of all of the attached devices, is 
characterized by an unfortunate emphasis on functionality over security. That is, industry 
has prioritized being quick to market (functionality), over being the most secure on the 
market (security). Attacks on DoD UAS, like the 2011 RQ-170 incident or more recent 
2018 Russian Global Positioning Sensor (GPS) jamming on smaller U.S. UAS in Syria, 
has demonstrated the need for stronger cybersecurity implementations on this world-wide 
network of networks [3].  
Internet of Things (IoT) is a collective term that describes a class of networked, 
data-sharing, quasi-autonomous entities that are designed to share data with little or no 
human interaction [4]. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Unmanned aerial systems 
(UASs), known more commonly as drones, share similar communications technology and 
traits with other IoT devices. These systems' underlying technologies are often 
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implemented with design vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors. Such 
vulnerabilities can go unnoticed and undetected unless an adequate cybersecurity 
assessment is conducted.  
The DoD has demonstrated confusion over the best course of action with regards 
to cybersecurity threats that can place our tactical operators and UASs at risk. On May 23, 
2018, the DoD issued a memorandum grounding all DoD operated UASs, with the 
exception of individual waivers granted to select U.S. forces and educational institutions 
to continue UAS operations [5]. This action was directly related to discovered 
vulnerabilities with popular COTS UASs currently utilized in some DoD environments. 
However, another reason for the ban was the simple fact that not a single military service 
had (or as this is currnelty written, has) a clear policy for mitigating risk while employing 
COTS UASs. As a result, UAS operators are left unprepared with neither a systematic 
method to identify and mitigate cystem risks, nor the criteria necessary to provide tactical 
commanders with a translation to operational risks to mission. This thesis targets this 
critical issue with the goal of providing a viable approach for including cyber risk for the 
tactical commander. 
The popularity and availability of COTS UASs have significantly increased in the 
public and military where they serve a wide variety of applications. One military 
application is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). UAS ISR is a principal 
DoD capability that is used to collect, process, and disseminate actionable information to 
decision makers at various command levels with using a wide-range of platforms and 
sensor payloads. United States military UAS utilization grew rapidly in the wake of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. The first documented military drone was 
launched in 1917, 14 years after the Wright Brothers’ landmark Kitty Hawk flight [6]. The 
Ruston Proctor Aerial Target was called a drone but functioned as a pilotless military 
munition [6]. Since then, technology has significantly advanced and has become a common 
tool in military and civilian applications. The U.S. defense budget allotted $6.05 billion in 
the FY 2019 DoD budget request for UAS acquisitions, which is an increase of $5 billion 
in the FY 2018 and FY 2017 requests [7]. From the $6.05 billion, $3.71 billion was 
allocated for procurement of new vehicles, $2.14 billion was set aside for research and 
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development, and $198 million was allocated for military construction [7]. The DoD is 
expected to procure approximately 3,250 new UASs, of which 3,070 are considered small 
UASs, or sUASs [7].  
This research explores: a) current cybersecurity assessments for tactical level 
sUASs, b) the security pillars and interconnectivity issues that sUAS cybersecurity 
assessments should address, and c) a methodology intended to create a sUAS Cybersecurity 
Risk Management Decision Matrix (CCRDM). Although this study primarily focuses on 
Group 1 through Group 3 UASs (e.g., Raven, ScanEagle, Puma, RQ-21), it is intended to 
function as a template for any and all future COTS or mil-spec UASs operating under DoD 
control.  
A. DEFINITION OF UAS 
While the issue of cybersecurity applies to all UAS, the boundaries of this study 
relate to small UASs (sUASs). sUASs contain multiple subsystems that should be 
independently assessed for cyber-centric capabilities. These subsystems should then be 
individually assessed for potential vulnerabilities that could result in operationally relevant 
violations to confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). Scoping this study to a more 
manageable level is achieved by narrowing the research to only those UASs deployed at 
the tactical edge; which means DoD defined Groups 1 through Group 3 UASs as seen in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1.   DoD UAS Group Descriptions. Source: [8]. 
UASs, as represented and discussed in this effort, are defined as “a system 
comprised of an unmanned aircraft and its associated elements required for operation” [8]. 
The aforementioned elements are broken down into subcategories that comprise the 
unmanned aircraft itself; payload, communications, control, support equipment, and the 
human operator. Aircraft types included in the study consist of fixed wing and quadcopter 
configurations, each varying with range and capability. Payloads come in a variety of 
different form factors, and can include electro-optical (EO) video cameras and 
electromagnetic warfare (EMW) sensors that may exploit networks or radar systems. In 
some cases, sUASs are used as network relay or communications hubs that connect 
geographically dispersed communications networks. Control communications can utilize 
Internet Protocol (IP) and Radio Frequency (RF) based protocols based on the specific 
aircraft configuration. Support equipment consists of Ground Control Stations (GCS), 
launch equipment, recovery equipment, and antennas. No system in this study is self-
sustaining, meaning each system ultimately requires the interaction of a human operators. 
This interaction represents a potential cyber vulnerability in itself. 
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Unmanned aircraft are further classified by the DoD into groups that are 
differentiated by maximum weight, operating altitudes, and operating speed [8]. Group 1 
UASs are often used for base security or small unit operations. These smaller UASs can be 
hand-launched, have a wide degree of self-containment, and are extremely portable. 
Group 2 UASs are small to medium sized platforms that conduct ISR and target acquisition 
mission sets. Portability and rapid deployment are reduced in this group of physically larger 
aircraft; however, the payload generally increases capability by adding features such as EO 
or infrared (IR) and laser range finding/designator (LRF/D) capabilities. Finally, Group 3 
UASs conduct longer range missions with more enhanced payloads relating to EO/IR, 
LRF/D, signal intelligence (SIGINT), communications relay, and chemical biological 
radiological nuclear explosive (CBRNE) detection [8]. The detailed characteristics of each 
DoD UAS group is further explained in the DoD UAS Group Descriptions Table. The next 
section provides context to the purpose of this effort and the tactical military application. 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
Implementing the use of emerging technologies, such as sUASs, into military 
missions requires an advanced risk assessment, at all levels - cradle to grave. A thorough 
understanding of each system’s cyber vulnerabilities is critical for employing appropriate 
mitigation techniques and lessening the overall risk. This effort is intended to provide the 
UAS commanders at the tactical level the tools needed to mitigate cybersecurity risk to 
mission, equipment, and personnel. First and foremost, specific cybersecurity risk 
assessments need to be conducted by the trained personnel, at the appropriate level, with 
proven methodologies. The operators and mission commanders at the tactical level can 
then incorporate local threat capabilities with the assessment of available UAS mission 
platforms, to either waive or accept the calculated risk. There is no need to invent new 
cybersecurity operational risk processes, since a majority of non-UAS-specific 
cybersecurity techniques can be tailored to address UAS vulnerabilities. Adding the 
practice will provide tactical users an opportunity to properly assess each scenario, and 
allow them to make a better-educated risk decision. 
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Making an educated risk decision in cybersecurity is not generally a simple yes or 
no decision. Consequently, the cybersecurity risk decision process should be robust enough 
to provide tactical operators and mission commanders the opportunity to make decision 
based on an understanding of situational and inherent risk. The proposed process should 
permit the tactical decision makers an opportunity to assess and make the best possible 
decision as to which system to operate and what mitigation actions to take. This effort will 
focus on two central questions on the quest to create a UAS cyber risk matrix that can be 
used by tactical commanders. The first is: What processes and considerations should a 
streamlined, full spectrum, UAS cybersecurity decision matrix incorporate for evaluation? 
The second is: What elements of existing non-UAS cybersecurity frameworks should be 
incorporated into the UAS cybersecurity decision matrix? Utilizing well-known and 
validated cybersecurity risk processess and considerations will facilitate the development 
of a streamlined research approach. 
C. APPROACH 
Initially, an assessment of current tools or methodologies used for non-UAS 
cybersecurity risk assessments will be conducted. Next, the discovered tools and/or 
techniques will be correlated as applicable to UAS hardware and software. Upon 
correlation of applicable methodologies, proven cyber strategies will be applied to the 
tactical UAS life cycle. This effort will determine where the decision-making responsibility 
for cybersecurity risk assessments should reside from the tactical perspective. Finally, a 
study of current UAS missions, in coordination with the previous research, will help 
develop a mission-agnostic UAS cybersecurity risk assessment framework. 
A general risk analysis assessment will be conducted focusing on RF and IP threats 
to UAS operations at the tactical level. Once the threats are identified, an initial UAS 
cybersecurity operational risk management decision matrix will be constructed. The initial 
matrix will be validated using accepted cybersecurity framework strategies promulgated 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (e.g., Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) and the Special Publications-SP800 series), and relevent DoD 
guidance. 
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The first objective involves the identification and assessments of potential threats 
to UAS operations. The methods to identify, correlate, and assign cybersecurity risk 
assessment methodologies will be determined by tailoring the cybersecurity fundamentals 
that already exist for non-UAS specific cybersecurity platforms. Once obtained, these will 
be recast into a tactical UAS cybersecurity risk decision management matrix. The 
aforementioned risk management decision matrix will be validated by an experienced 
tactical UAS operator; which may-in turn-lead to future work.  
D. DESIRED END STATE 
The purpose of this effort is to create a UAS Cybersecurity Risk Management 
Decision Matrix (CRMDM) that a tactical commander can utilize prior to launch. 
Integrating cybersecurity into tactical UAS operations will provide a framework for 
employing a critical military technology, while safeguarding sensitive information, and 
will act as a mission security multiplier. More information afforded to the appropriate 
decisionmakers will energize mission confidence, minimize the loss of sensitive data, and 
provide the mission commander (MC), officer in charge (OIC), or higher authority the 
opportunity to make a more educated cybersecurity risk decision. The CRMDM is not 
intended to be the decision authority, but merely a tool that will help bring UAS 
cybersecurity considerations to the attention of tactical commanders. The desired end state 
is to create a useable and understandable tool that shrinks the current gap between existing 
operational considerations and cybersecurity considerations for tactical applications of 
UAS technology. The next chapter provides a detailed background of system-agnostic 
UAS components and their functions.  
8 
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II. UAS COMPONENTS, ATTACK SURFACE BACKGROUND,
AND SUPPORTING STANDARDS 
The purpose and intent of sUAS employment has evolved since its inception, which 
is also true of the characteristics of sUAS internal design, diverse functionality, and 
inherent cyber-centric capabilities that classify a UAS as an IoT device. Compared to early 
models, late model sUASs have increased range, greater optical resolution, and provide the 
operator with real-time telemetry, command and control (C2) data, embedded sensors, and 
payload data. Flight times have significantly expanded. Early sUASs were lucky to see 20 
minutes of flight time, and now 20 hours of flight time is routine for some of the Group 1 
through 3 sUASs. The data capacity and data transfer between the sUASs and Ground 
Control Systems (GCSs) has evolved from its early design. sUAS form and function is a 
superb fit for both military and civilian C2 operations. It is important to understand the 
basic sUAS components and interfaces that are subject to malicious attacks, interception, 
and source localization by an adversary.  
Once the system components are classified appropriately, then we will apply known 
federal information system (IS) security standards to mitigate potential risk to the mission, 
risk to the equipment, and risk to human life. The CRMDM must reduce potential 
compromise of sUAS CIA-centric information attributes. Potential cybersecurity 
mitigations can be identified by applying applicable Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS), and Special Publications (SP) drafted by the National Institute of Science 
and Technology (NIST). The FIPS publications of interest include FIPS 199 Standards for 
Security Classification of Federal Information Systems, and FIPS 200 Minimum Security 
Standards for Federal Information and Information Systems. The SPs referenced by the 
aforementioned FIPS publications, and are utilized for risk mitigation standards, include 
the NIST SP 800–30 Revision 1 Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments and NIST SP 
800–53 Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems. It is important 
to understand UAS components in order to determine where vulnerabilities can exist, and 
which potential mitigations might address these vulnerabilities. This is covered in the next 
section. 
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A. UAS COMPONENTS 
UASs vary greatly in design, capabilities, and the interconnected devices. However, 
most UASs share a moderate number of functions, features, and components. 
Understanding the basic UAS sub-model architecture is necessary to determine 
cybersecurity requirements and ultimately produce a more robust UAS CRMDM. Six 
major component groups, subdivided by function, should be analyzed for cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities. The first group is the communications system, the second group is the 
aircraft itself, the third group is the GCS equipment, the fourth group is the ground support 
equipment, the fifth group is the software, and the sixth group is the human operator. 
1. Communications Systems
UAS communications possess a high adversary target value. It has this value since 
the RF communications are transmitted via wireless means, and thus vulnerable to 
observation capture, copy, retransmission, spoofing, and denial (jamming). Like other RF 
systems, two modes of in-flight communications exist within UAS communications suites: 
direct line-of-sight (LOS), and satellite-enabled over-the-horizon (OTH), which is also 
known as beyond line of sight (BLOS) [9]. An emerging OTH UAS communications 
technique is to use cellular connectivity for communications, which allows the UAS to 
send and receive communications through the cellular network, significantly extending the 
aircraft’s range. Though this cellular connectivity provides OTH operator-to-UAS control; 
the actual RF mode is LOS. In one sense, this is a hybrid mode or method (multiple LOS 
circuits daisy-chained to provide OTH distances. Some UAS variants use tethered or 
optical communications. However, for sUASs the most common communication mode is 
LOS. UASs can use a single communication channel that multiplexes both payload and 
flight data, or these two data types can each be carried over dedicated channels [10]. A 
typical UAS communications scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Typical UAV Communications Scenario. Source: [11]. 
LOS communications are the most common type of communications for Groups 1 
through 3 UASs owing to size, endurance, range, and mission sets. Smaller aircraft have 
less room for fuel and flight sensors, and can stay operational for comparatively shorter 
durations than the Group 4 and 5 UASs. Satellite Communications (SATCOM) is used for 
larger, long-endurance, aircraft, such as the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk , that operate 
OTH [12]. Although SATCOM is an important topic in cybersecurity, the LOS 
communication techniques used in smaller UASs is where this thesis and resulting UAS 
CRMDM will focus.  
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RF-based LOS communications can span a wide range of the RF portion of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. However, most military LOS applications are centered in the 
Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) bands, with some reaching 
into the Super High Frequency (SHF) band. Examples of RF protocols operating in these 
bands include: microwave, Bluetooth, or 802.11 Wi-Fi communications [10]. Digital C2 
and payload communications using TCP/IP onboard the aircraft must be modulated if 
transmitted from the aircraft to the GCS and vice versa. Integrated modems modulate and 
demodulate the UAS communications from digital signals into analog signals-and vice 
versa-for transmission. Modulated signals are attached to a carrier wave and transmitted 
and received using transceivers on the UASs and GCSs. Analog C2 and payload 
communications do not require the modulation and demodulation step and are transmitted 
using the same carrier wave methodology as modulated digital communications. LOS 
communication is increasingly moving into the microwave portion of the RF spectrum. 
This is due in part to the already inundated UHF band, in part to the increased bandwidth 
available at microwave frequencies, and in part to the fact that these higher frequencies are 
less affected by refraction than the lower frequency RF bands [13]. Bluetooth 
communications are not ideal for long range C2 or payload designs, since Bluetooth can 
only operate out to a nominal 40-foot range. Despite this range constraint, Bluetooth 
communications can exist onboard the aircraft or at the GCS and can be modulated for 
longer distance transmissions. Wi-Fi is another shorter distance UAS communications 
option, but it can be used in the same way as Bluetooth. Bluetooth communications reside 
in the 2.4Ghz RF range and Wi-Fi covers both the 2.4Ghz and 5Ghz RF ranges. Both 
Bluetooth and Wi-Fi operate in the common unlicensed Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) RF bands. UAS communications transmit using the same technology 
radios, wireless routers, as any typical LOS communications transmission technique. This 
means that without mitigations, communications using these technologies are susceptible 
to the same threats encountered when they are used in non-UAS environments. In fact, the 
risk can be considered greater given the longer distances over which the RF-carried data is 
exposed.  
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UAS communications do not only exist between the GCS and aircraft. GCSs, 
aircraft, and associated ground equipment can be configured for TCP/IP communications 
and connect to an intranet or the Internet. Some COTS UASs, such as the Da-Jiang 
Innovations (DJI) family of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), communicate and 
transmit flight data back to the parent company using proprietary software from the UAV 
to the GCS, and then from the GCS through the user’s network. Some military GCSs and 
aircraft communicate with ground support equipment via fiber optics, ethernet, or through 
wireless communication protocols. UAS internal and external communications designs, as 
noted above, can include standard configurations, proprietary configurations, or use a 
combination of both. Standard configurations include well known and commonly used 
software and hardware packages that span multiple UAS variants. Proprietary 
configurations are those that are specific to a certain family or brand of UAS, and not 
available for use on any type of UAS foreign to the manufacturer. These configurations 
may not be available to the operator. Each system operator should have, at a minimum, a 
basic understanding of the communications paths, protocols, and data processing 
components. Next, the aircraft is one of the top two critical components of the UAS. 
2. Aircraft
Airframes come in many shapes, styles and sizes. Despite the variety in airframe 
appearance, the basic components are relatively similar. The UAS airframe itself is 
constructed with lightweight material and is aerodynamically stable. Obviously, there is no 
room for a pilot, which makes the avionics even more critical. The variance in avionics 
depends on the UAS manufacturer. Some examples of UAS avionics include the flight 
computer, flight processor, and power distribution assembly [10]. Additionally, aircraft 
components include payloads that support both the airframe design and meet the mission 
needs, mission or payload controllers, and communications capabilities [10]. 
The flight computer is the brains of UAS aircraft and interlinks onboard sensors 
with the UAS specific control surfaces with the sole purpose of collectively directing the 
aircraft’s flight [10]. Sensors onboard that provide data input to the flight computer include 
altimeters, accelerometers, gyros, magnetometers, pressure sensors, and GPS systems [10]. 
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The UAS control surfaces can include ailerons, elevators, elevons, propellers, rudders, and 
winglets [10]. 
Payloads are typically central to the aircraft design and some UASs have the 
capability to add additional payloads based on the design. Payloads often define the UAS 
mission and usually provide the capabilities for military and civilian entities interested in 
conducting dangerous, dull, and/or dirty missions with a much lower overhead cost [10]. 
Additional sensors include video cameras, infrared sensors, and environmental sensors are 
other forms of potential UAS payloads. UASs can process and retain data onboard the unit, 
transmit acquired data to the GCS or a secondary observation station for analysis, or consist 
of a hybrid of both onboard and external data processing [10]. The ScanEagle UAS 
illustrated in Figure 2 is a common Group 2 system used by the DoD. 
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Figure 2. ScanEagle® Size, Weight, Power, Performance, Sensor, 
and Data Information. Source: [14]. 
Mission and payload controllers are used to control the payload sensors onboard. 
These controllers constitute another computing and operational UAS component that 
leverages wired or wireless data paths that links operator control to the installed sensors 
[10]. Payload controllers can also direct payload data back to the operator for real-time or 
near real-time mission processing [10]. Mission and payload controllers are typically 
configured prior to launch, but there are some applications that permit real-time mission 
and payload manipulation to meet changing mission sets [10]. 
The design and functionality share the same techniques and procedures as a simple 
computer system or IoT device. Little attention was focused on the cyber-side of UASs 
until the DoD issued the UAV vulnerability memorandum [5]. The major differences 
between a standard IT infrastructure and the UAS are the operating altitude, proximity to 
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the threat, dependency on other systems (i.e., GPS), and nature of the mission. The UAS 
component that is essentially identical to the traditional computer systems is the GCS.  
3. GCS
UAS GCSs come in a variety of sizes and are considered the UASs primary mission 
controller. The GCS is the UAS's central node of communication that receives, transmits, 
processes, and distributes data collected from the aircraft’s C2 and payload links [15]. The 
GCS subsystem can be further subdivided into two types, portable and stationary. 
Portable sUAS GCS can consist of extremely basic components, such as a hand 
controller, ruggedized laptop, RF transceiver unit, and a controller box [15]. More 
simplistic GCS designs combine the four aforementioned portable GCS elements into a 
compact hand controller connected to a cellular phone or tablet, which is the standard for 
many of the COTS sUASs. The video feeds and other onboard sensors can be controlled 
by the aircraft operator, or they can be simultaneously controlled by an additional payload 
operator.  
Larger UASs, still residing in the Group 1 through Group 3 size range, may utilize 
a fixed location GCS that maintains all the previously mentioned GCS functionality but 
incorporates a larger network construct that acts as a server for multiple onboard UAS 
sensors in addition to ground control equipment. A good example of a high-end fixed 
ground station is the one for the Boeing Insitu ScanEagle platform. The ScanEagle GCS 
consists of multiple directional antennas, antenna modems, data interface modems for data 
distribution, software environment servers and workstations, autonomous tracking 
computers, fiber optic trunk lines, a C2 hand controller, and a payload controller [16].  
The GCS size and capability are not the key takeaway; however, the identified 
networking capabilities, data storage, data transmission, and wireless communications 
inherent to UAS design must, at a minimum, incorporate a cybersecurity assessment 
criteria prior to launch. The GCS components function in the same way as other DoD 
critical infrastructure, with the same intricacy as a network. The size and complexity of 
UAS ground support equipment variations are similar to the GCSs The ScanEagle example 
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illustrated in Figure 3 uses one workstation, configured for one operator, to operate the 
platform. 
Figure 3. ScanEagle® Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). 
Source: [14]. 
4. Ground Support Equipment
Ground support equipment varies from almost nothing, in the case of small 
quadcopters, to fully tailored launching and recovery equipment that takes a team of 
operators to manage. Some of the launchers are isolated and require remoted or wired GCS 
interaction. Others are launched from a fully remoted network connection back to the GCS 
that can be feet or miles from the launch site. The larger the aircraft and the more sensors 
it can carry generally requires a larger ground support footprint. Ground support equipment 
that is connected to the GCS is considered an information device and should carry the same 
active security measures as any DoD IS. The Mark 4 Launcher, Compact Mark 4 Launcher 
and SkyHook® shown in the ScanEagle Unmanned Aircraft System figure are examples 
of the ScanEagle UAS ground support equipment. 
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5. Software
UAS software, like the ground support equipment, is typically proprietary and is a 
potentially exploitable. UAS software is vulnerable to attack if identified vulnerabilities 
are not addressed. Threats can exploit UASs via Internet-based connections or via portable 
software devices. Portable devices can include thumb drives or compact discs that provide 
system software updates. Certain UAS software actually transmits device usage data via 
IP connectivity that is stored off-site using cloud computing services for company 
consumption. External user data exfiltrated from the UAS was the driving factor behind 
the 2018 DoD UAS flight ban and heavy restrictions of UAS use in military applications. 
The difficulty in securing IP-based software updates on each unique UAS software system 
is complicated by non-DoD third-party vendors, which increases risk to mission, risk to 
equipment, and puts operational forces at risk of exposure.  
6. UAS Operators
The human element is arguably the weakest links in cybersecurity. Systems, 
including IoT systems, are designed by human programmers and architects to perform 
specific functions. Just as in the case with the creation of the Internet, the desired intent of 
IP-based traffic was to exchange data over a distance with relatively high speed. 
Historically, security is often an afterthought in data processing system development. 
Identification of required features that fit seamlessly with system design and 
conceptualizing low-drag freedom of functionality are at the forefront of system design. 
Essentially, users wanted ISs that were extremely fast, use the fewest components to keep 
costs low, and were not complicated by overly restrictive policies.  
The above-mentioned computer system approaches would be acceptable if not for 
malicious intentions on the part of bad actors. Malicious threats come in two forms, 
external and internal. Insider threats are further subdivided into intentional and 
unintentional actors. These actors have potential to induce irreversible damage to sensitive 
data, facilitate unauthorized access to network systems, and provide access to additional 
network assets. External threats are constantly probing system boundaries to gain access to 
sensitive information. Persistent external threats even try to leverage potential weaknesses 
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by exploiting internal threats. For example, the untrained and unwary technician can 
unknowingly open a back door to a UAS if they use an unauthorized storage device on 
UAS hardware to save data. Another operator could inadvertently connect a UAS laptop 
to an unsecured network rather than an authorized military network. The internal threats 
have significant potential to cause grave damage to national security ISs, especially when 
bypassing active security protocols either intentionally or unintentionally. Regardless of 
the motive, the act puts the mission, equipment, and personnel at risk. 
B. ATTACK SURFACE BACKGROUND 
Modeling the UAS vulnerabilities under the Federal Information System 
Management Act (FISMA) defined three core security objectives of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability to then apply mitigating security controls will introduce a proven 
approach to frame the issues [17]. The UAV cybersecurity threat model, shown in Figure 5, 
introduced in 2012 captures potential UAS threat vectors that can be compared to existing 
control measures for the UAS CRMDM [11]. Existing control measures from FIPS 200 
and NISP SP 800–53 will then be used to correctly categorize the likelihood, overall 
impact, and finally to derive a risk weight. The next step is to dive a little deeper into the 
three core security objectives, relate each with the appropriate or known risks, and then 
apply security controls to mitigate the overall risk factor. If the mission commander and 
operators understand the potential cyber security risk based on the tailored mission, then 
an adequate go or no-go criteria can be applied to almost any scenario with some potential 
required adjustments. Dividing the UAS cybersecurity challenge into distinct areas of 
concern will frame the design of the CRMDM. The descriptions are discussed from the left 
to right using Figure 4 as the guide. 
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Figure 4. UAV System Cyber-Security Threat Model. Source: [11]. 
1. Confidentiality Threats
UAS confidentiality vulnerabilities exist when the interception of information 
(transfer/loss) occurs from the GCS, UAV, C2 links, and the human operator [11]. These 
four threat surfaces relate to systematic vulnerabilities commonly found in UAS design, 
protocol usage, network connectivity, and human error. Figure 5 frames the threats to UAS 
confidentiality, which are described in this section.  
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Figure 5. UAS Confidentiality Threats. Source: [11]. 
The GCS can be a large server rack, networked computing systems, or a small 
computing device. Just like any other computing systems, GCS are vulnerable to computer 
viruses. Viruses are computer code created with the intention of manipulating a system 
control or data. Malware, or malicious software, is a source for different viruses and system 
hijacking tools. Keyloggers are used to remotely collect or record input-output (IO) 
activity, such as keyboards strokes. Trojans, another form of malware, are disguised as 
legitimate software but work much differently under the covers. Trojans can be used to 
perform a number of malicious activities, for example control software systems and 
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exfiltrate data. The GCS is susceptible to any of the mentioned threats, and a careful 
approach must be applied to mitigate unnecessary risks. 
UAV software is as susceptible to exploitation as the GCS suite, since they share 
common network paths and protocols designed to maintain system connectivity [11]. If the 
GCS is infected with malicious software or permits unauthorized access, then there is a 
high likelihood the UAV software could also be affected [11]. Unattended or unauthorized 
physical access to the UAV is also another potential threat vector that could put the UAV 
software at risk if malicious software is introduced to the aircraft.  
The communications links are an integral part of UAS operations. Vulnerabilities, 
associated with communications, link a significant share of threats to confidentiality. C2 
signals can be spoofed with an intended goal of de-authenticating the UAV with the GCS. 
ISs have experienced malicious protocol attacks at many layers of the protocol stack that 
induce various types of protocol malfunction. Newer cross-layer attacks, can impact UAV 
C2 through at least three methods. One method is Media Access Control (MAC) Poisoning, 
a second is known as Hammer-and-Anvil, and a third is the Transport Control Protocol 
(TCP) Timeout [18]. MAC poisoning is the act of periodically falsifying a frequencies 
channel reservation to cause the device to eventually switch to another channel [18]. 
Hammer-and-Anvil cross-layer attacks utilize a jammer and compromised network node 
to force traffic redirection through the compromised node [18]. TCP Timeouts occur when 
TCP flows are disrupted by increasing packet round-trip-time and forcing the sender to 
increase retransmission timeouts and delay forwarding packets [18]. The delay in 
forwarding packets causes TCP traffic to eventually enter a timeout state and results in 
dropped packets [18]. Due to the often uncontrolled transmission medium, C2 
transmissions are also easily intercepted by eavesdroppers. 
Confidential UAV communications links have the potential to become victims of 
eavesdropping or, even worse, hijacking. Confidentiality is lost when anyone who is not 
intended to intercept UAS communications can do so. Exposing UAS telemetry and 
payload communication data can offer system details, location, and even expose critical 
mission data if not protected. Hijacking UAS communications means essentially losing 
authenticated control, as a result of blocked or spoofed signals [19]. These intentional 
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interferences with UAV signals can include jamming the frequency at which the C2 or 
payload signals are received. Blocking, also known as jamming, is intended to prevent the 
receiver from detecting authenticated signals. The three well-known types of signal 
jamming are applicable to narrowband, broadband, and spread spectrum transmissions 
[19]. Spread spectrum signals are the least impacted by jamming due to the nature of their 
frequency hopping design, which helps avoid concentrating the signal into a predictable 
and targetable bandwidth.  
The human element has consistently been the weakest link in cybersecurity, 
especially with the growing success rate of malware, phishing attempts, and social 
engineering. Another risk posed by humans is that of the disgruntled or unwitting personnel 
within the organization. Untrained, unknowing, and/or unhappy personnel can cause a 
threat to the UAS IS confidentiality.  
2. Integrity Threats
UAS information integrity is comprised of two types of activities: “fabrication of 
new information” and “modification of exiting information” [11]. The information can 
consist of C2 and/or payload communications [11]. Natural phenomenon and malicious 
activities are two known ways to modify or fabricate RF information [11]. Figure 6 frames 
the threats to UAS integrity, which is described in this section.  
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Figure 6. UAS Integrity Threats. Source: [11]. 
The integrity of UAS communications information can be compromised by 
unintended or natural events through radiofrequency interference (RFI) or electromagnetic 
interference (EMI) [20]. Unintended events can induce signal noise that may interfere with 
signal quality [20]. UASs, like many other RF communications systems cannot compensate 
when out of phase signals interfere with the original signal strength. Three different sources 
of interference exist; natural radiators, unintentional radiators, and intentional radiators 
[20]. Natural radiators include such elements as lightning or other atmospheric electrical 
discharges, strong solar activity, and meteorological events like snow or dust storms [20]. 
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Unintentional radiators consist of man-made devices that radiate electromagnetic waves as 
a by-product of their intended function [20]. Examples of unintentional radiators can 
include high capacity power lines and transformers, household devices like microwaves 
and small consumer electronics, and direct current motors [20]. Intentional radiators are 
designed to utilize the electromagnetic spectrum and are a major competitor for RF 
spectrum allocation. Intentional EMI comes from anything that is transmitting RF, such as 
TV transmitters, Wi-Fi devices, cordless phones, hobbyist radios, and IoT devices [20]. Of 
the two types of information manipulators, unintended or natural events create a lesser 
concern and most UAS RF subcomponents can adjust to these rare anomalies, or are not 
generally operated in conditions that create this interference [11].  
Malicious UAS communications attacks are a major threat to UAS integrity. 
Malicious attacks are known to come from compromised communications links, 
communications systems, and now airborne counter UAS systems [11]. Compromised 
communications from anywhere in the UAS can lead to devastating results on mission 
accomplishment, data integrity, and affect UAS confidentiality and availability. 
Compromised links simply mean the link is not completely under control of the dedicated 
GCS. Malicious actors can threaten UAS integrity by introducing malicious code into the 
UAS software and communications links [11]. Malicious code, found in an available 
Maldrone payload, is able to take over the control of UAVs using the ARM processor and 
Linux operating systems (OS) [21]. Air-borne threats are able to jam and retransmit UAS 
RF signals, distort or stomp signal integrity, and utilize captured communications feeds to 
facilitate a replay attack [11]. Signal jamming impacts both the integrity and availability of 
UAS communications [11]. Jamming distorts the receiver’s ability to receive the correct 
signal and it can raise the RF noise floor up to a level that negatively impacts receiver 
sensitivity [11]. If jamming is followed by retransmitting, then the overall impact rests with 
UAS communications integrity, since the received signal is not the originally intended 
signal from the GCS or UAV [11]. Malicious actors can collect the transmitted UAS 
communications and replay them at a later point to confuse the UAV. Additionally, a 
skilled malicious actor can tap into the collected or live communications feeds and edit 
them for retransmission at a later point in the UAS mission [11].  
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The last component of the CIA trifecta, UAS availability, is as critical as 
confidentiality and integrity of the UAS information.  
3. Availability Threats
The loss of UAS availability means that the system, or subcomponents of the 
system are not available to conduct the mission. The primary sources of UAS non-
availability are communications jamming, denial of service (DoS), or falsifying C2 
communications [11]. Figure 7 frames the threats to availability, which is described in this 
section.  
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Figure 7. UAS Availability Threats. Source: [11]. 
DoS or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks against UASs come in three 
types: buffer overflow, protocol flooding, and spoofing (or smurfing) [11]. A buffer 
overflow occurs when a program’s allocated memory buffer is overrun and adjacent 
memory is overwritten. The adjacent memory would be utilized by the program to store in 
program instructions and pointers. When the required instructions are overwritten, then the 
program will likely crash or the attacker can attempt to execute shell code that can give the 
attacker access to the kernel shell. Once the attacker has access to the shell, then additional 
exploits can be installed on the OS. Flooding, or protocol flooding, exists when a node is 
bombarded with requests, for example synchronize (SYN), User Datagram Protocol 
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(UDP), and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) requests [11]. Figure 7 shows ping 
as an attack vector. Ping is a system administrator tool that sends ICMP echo requests and 
awaits an ICMP echo reply from the desired recipient. Essentially both ICMP and Ping 
attacks use the system design against itself. Smurfing attacks utilize ICMP packets 
“spoofed” with the victim’s IP address that are forwarded to many different nodes, which 
in turn reply with many ICMP echo replies and bog down the network.  
Falsified UAS C2 and critical data signals have the potential to cause the aircraft to 
receive false GPS input data or false control signals [11]. UAS telemetry data is heavily 
reliant on accurate GPS data and this is one of the most well-known threat vectors for the 
UAS aircraft. GPS uses a low strength signal, which means it is predisposed to jamming 
or false GPS signal injection. GPS spoofing is dangerous to aircraft operations and has left 
U.S. military units in the dark during ISR missions.  
It is important to develop a credible risk management framework as a reference for 
the UAS CRMDM. The DoD, in conjunction with NIST, has worked to build a framework 
that addresses information security (also known as cybersecurity) requirements for federal 
ISs. Standards development started at NIST with its 2004 release of FIPS 199, “Standards 
for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems” [22]. Shortly 
thereafter, NIST released FIPS 200, which is titled “Minimum Security Requirements for 
Federal Information and Information Systems” [23]. Appropriate security controls were 
released by NIST in the SP 800–53 “Recommended Security Controls for Federal 
Information Systems,” which align with three impact levels identified in FIPS 200 [24]. 
The NIST 800–30 Revision 1 is the “Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments” that outlines 
a six-step risk assessment process [25]. It is important to note that these references were 
not created as standards for Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs), such a sUASs. CPS introduces 
a dynamic not previously considered in traditional IT. For example, sUASs physically 
operate in adversarial territory at a distance from the operator as opposed to traditional IT 
that is normally controlled on friendly ground and at the operator's fingertips. The 




In 2002, the E-Government Act was initiated as public law [26]. NIST was tasked 
by FISMA to create “standards to be used by all federal agencies to categorize all 
information and ISs collected or maintained by or on behalf of each agency based on the 
objectives of providing appropriate levels of information security according to a range of 
risk levels” [22]. Additionally, NIST was tasked to create recommended guidelines for 
each type of information and IS and to develop minimum information security 
requirements [22]. FIPS 199 addresses the first requirement to “develop standards for 
categorizing information and information systems” [22]. 
In FIPS 199, information and IS categorization is based on the potential impact to 
mission, asset protection, legal obligations, functionality, and personnel protection if an 
adverse event should occur [22]. Three primary security objectives were defined by 
FISMA; confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) [22]. Confidentiality is defined 
as, “preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information” [22]. More 
specifically, if confidentiality is compromised then the “unauthorized disclosure of 
information” has occurred [22]. Integrity is defined as “guarding against improper 
information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-
repudiation and authenticity” [22]. Modifying information is considered a loss of integrity 
[22]. Availability is defined as “ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information,” which means one cannot use the IS when needed [22].  
FIPS 199 describes three impact levels: low, moderate, and high [22]. Low impact 
has a “limited adverse effect” on operations, assets, or individuals [22]. The low impact 
degradation to mission does not impact the primary mission function but may have limited 
results, minor damage to assets, low financial impact, and minor harm to personnel [22]. 
Moderate impacts to the CIA triad would reasonably be expected to induce “serious 
adverse effect” on operations, assets, or individuals [22]. The loss of CIA at a moderate 
level of impact could reasonably be expected to yield substantial degradation to the mission 
capability, duration, and effectiveness is considerably reduced [22]. High potential impact 
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to the operations, assets, or individuals will result in “sever or catastrophic adverse 
effect[s]” [22]. High impact equates to mission failure.  
The FIPS 199 further applies the security category to the information types and ISs. 
This process applies the overall CIA impact to each type of system or type of information 
[22]. An example of this process is formed in the equation, “SC information type = 
{(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, impact), (availability, impact)}” [22]. Security 
control (SC) is applied to the information type in this example. In practical application, the 
information type will be replaced by the type of information and the impact will be scaled 
using the aforementioned low, medium, or high categories. Information types can have a 
negligible impact level, below the low threshold and be assigned a “N/A” for not applicable 
[22]. This is not the case with IS, since there is at least a low minimum potential impact 
that is inherent when protecting system processes and functions that are necessary for the 
system to function. Generally, the highest impact category will be selected for each 
information type, which is known as the “high water mark” [22]. The culmination of 
mapping the security objectives with its potential of impact are further explained in 
Table 2.  
FIPS 200 is the next sequential policy document on characterizing the IS. 
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Table 2.     Potential Impact Definitions for Security Objectives. 
Source: [22]. 
5. FIPS 200
FIPS 200 [23] is the second NIST document resulting from the E-Government Act 
of 2002 [26]. The publication furthers system categorization from FIPS 199 by specifying 
minimum security requirements for IS and information security and incorporates a risk-
based process to select security controls that will meet minimum requirements [23]. The 
end-goal of FIPS 200 is to facilitate a “consistent, comparable, and repeatable approach for 
selecting and specifying security controls for ISs that meet minimum security standards” 
[23]. The IS impact levels remain consistent with those previously outlined in FIPS 200. 
The minimum-security requirements and security control selection are main focus of FIPS 
200 [23]. 
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Seventeen security-centric areas requiring CIA protections are defined in FIPS 200 
that represent each area of concern with the security of Federal information and ISs are 
listed in Table 3 [23].  
Table 3.      FIPS Security-Centric Areas Requiring CIA Protections. 
Source: [23]. 
Access Control Media Protection 
Awareness and Training Physical and Environmental Protection 
Audit and Accountability Planning 
Certification, Accreditation, and 
Security Assessments 
Personnel Security 
Configuration Management Risk Assessment 
Contingency Planning System and Communications Protection 
Identification and Authentication System and Services Acquisition 
Incident Response System and Information Integrity 
Maintenance 
According to FIPS 200, minimum-security control selection is based on the premise 
that each organization is required to ultimately achieve adequate security by implementing 
controls and assurance requirements that are outlined in NIST SP 800–53 [23]. FIPS 200 
discussed the security controls in NIST SP 800–53 are all associated with the designated 
impact levels of the IS that were originally determined in the security categorization 
process [23]. More specifically, the low-impact IS must have low baselined controls in 
place, moderate-impact systems must utilize moderate controls, and the high-impact must 
use high baselined control measures [23]. All security controls must be employed in each 
security control area unless specific allowances permit tailored control measure 
implementation [23].  
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6. NIST Special Publication 800–53
NIST SP 800–53 is the security control source document that provides control 
measures in accordance with FIPS 199. The publication describes fundamentals in security 
control selection, provides a process for selecting controls, and is describes IS related 
controls for low, moderate, and high impact ISs [24].  
The fundamental components in chapter 2 of SP 800–53 provide an outline for the 
security control structure, baselines, designation, and assurance [24]. This document aligns 
the security controls into identifiers and families. Table 4 provides the listing of security 
control classes, families, and digraph identifiers. The security control structure 
encompasses three distinct sections named the control section, the supplemental guidance 
section, and the control enhancement section [24]. Baselines are the initial minimum-
security controls recommended for an IS based on the systems categorization in FIPS 199 
[24]. The system categories are a product of the initial risk assessment [24]. Security 
control assurance is the level of confidence that is acquired once security controls are 
selected and in-place [24]. 
Table 4.    Security Control Identifiers and Family Names.  
Source: [24]. 
The process for selecting security controls in SP 800–53 involves: "selecting 
appropriate security control baselines; tailoring the baselines; documenting the security 
control selection process; and applying the control selection process to new development 
and legacy systems" [24]. The initial selection employs the FIPS 199 framework of 
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choosing the high-water mark from the ISs impact level based on CIA [24]. Once the initial 
baseline is selected, six follow-on steps need to be considered as an attempt to tailor the 
baseline [24]. The first follow-on step is to identify common security controls within the 
initial baseline [24]. The second follow-on step is to scope the baseline [24]. Scoping can 
be from a technology, infrastructure, scalability-centric, or a need to compensate from the 
initial control selection [24]. The third step is to consider implementing compensating 
controls [24]. Compensating controls are comparable controls, possibly adopted from 
alternate sources, that address organizationally defined minimum and maximum acceptable 
values [24]. The fourth step is to “assign security control parameter values” [24]. Assigning 
parameter values is conducted after the initial selection of compensating controls and 
assigned organizationally-centric values for each parameter [24]. The fifth step is to 
supplement the control baseline if additional security controls are required by laws or 
regulations, but not specifically listed in SP 800-53 [24]. The sixth step is to ensure the 
high-level abstract security statements include enough detail to answer what the control is 
for, how it is to be implemented, and the overall intent of the control [24]. Documenting 
the process creates a record of “relevant decisions taken during the security control 
selection process” and “provides sound rationale for those decisions” [24]. Finally, controls 
can be used for new systems, such as new UASs, as a "requirements definition" or legacy 
systems using a "gap analysis perspective" [24].  
7. NIST Special Publication 800–30
NIST SP 800–30 is the federal guide to conducting risk assessments on IS and 
expands on NIST SP 800–39 “Managing Risk for Information Systems” guidance [25]. 
The guidelines were broadly developed, through a technical lens, and are translatable to 
similarly developed national security systems [25]. The applicability of SP 800–30 reaches 
each tier of the risk management hierarchy and provides step-by-step specifics for the risk 
assessment process [25]. Consistent monitoring is critical to ensure the risk levels are 
addressed when risk changes, and SP 800–30 offers guidance on the appropriate way to 
monitor risk on an ongoing basis [25].  
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The risk management process is illustrated using four distinct steps as shown in 
Figure 8. Framing the issue is the key to the risk management processes [25]. A company 
or agency can describe the operating environment where the risk decisions are initiated 
[25]. Framing addresses how risk is assessed, responded to, and monitored [25]. “Assess” 
encompasses the identification of threats, vulnerabilities, adverse impact, and likelihood of 
harm [25]. “Response” is how an organization plans to respond to risk after it is determined 
by the risk assessment [25]. Responding to risk involves developing different Courses of 
Action (COAs), evaluating the new COAs, selecting appropriate COAs that are aligned 
with the acceptable risk tolerance, and implementing risk response actions based on the 
desired COA [25]. “Monitor” determines the processes by which risk is monitored over 
time [25]. Monitoring risk includes assessing the effectiveness of risk response actions, 
defining risk-impacting changes in the systems environment, and verifying planned 
response actions are implemented and aligned with institutional regulatory directives or 
standards [25].  
 




The methodology consists of the actual risk assessment process, the risk model, an 
assessment approach, and an analysis approach [25]. The aforementioned components of 
the risk assessment methodology are illustrated in the risk assessment process of SP 800-
30 (Figure 9). The process helps prepare organizations to prepare for the risk assessment 
process, to conduct the assessments, to communicate the results to key organizational 
components, and how to maintain risk assessments over time [25]. Risk models essentially 
provide context to the risk factors and their relationship [25]. Risk factors include the 
threat, threat events, vulnerabilities, impact, likelihood, and any affecting condition [25].  
Figure 9. Relationship among Risk Framing Components. 
Source: [25]. 
The risk model is developed to determine, through an identified process, the 
likelihood of a potential threat and the impact it will have on the IS [25]. An example of a 
generic risk model is shown in Figure 10. Threat modeling will provide a uniform path that 
analysts can feed credible intelligence data into and arrive at an effective understanding of 
organizational risk. Understanding the threat characteristics using the likeliness of success 
will provide a realistic, if not exact, match to pair with the vulnerabilities [25]. This will 
provide an overall degree of impact that produces an organizational risk to mission or the 
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organization itself [25]. The most user-influenced step within this risk model is the ability 
to mitigate vulnerabilities or predisposed conditions by enabling the proper security 
controls.  
 
Figure 10. Generic Risk Model with Key Risk Factors. Source: [25]. 
The three assessment types outlined in SP 800–30 are: quantitative, qualitative, and 
semi-quantitative [25]. Quantitative assessments use a number-oriented methodology to 
determine the risk value [25]. Numerically assessing values requires interpretation and may 
lead to confusion when dealing with assumptions [25]. Qualitative assessments use high, 
medium, or low principals to assess risk without the use of numbers [25]. Finally, semi-
quantitative uses a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methodologies that uses bins for 
value-ranges to determine an overall area high, medium, or low assessment value [25]. In 
order to successfully use the semi-quantitative value system, it is important to ensure each 
bin value is explicitly defined and provide understandable examples [25].  
Assessment approaches come in three types: threat-oriented, impact-oriented, 
vulnerability oriented [25]. The threat-oriented approach is appropriate when the identified 
threat and defined threat events are known and can be used in an assessment scenario [25]. 
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Also, threat-oriented approaches identify vulnerabilities using the threat as context, with 
impacts identified by the adversary’s intent [25]. The impact-oriented approach is 
appropriate when the impacts or anticipated consequences from a threat event are used to 
determine the overall impact [25]. The vulnerability-oriented approach starts with the 
vulnerabilities, or pre-disposed conditions, in the IS or supporting environment [25]. 
Threat events are then identified that could exploit the known vulnerabilities [25].  
Figure 11 details the actual risk assessment process. Chapter 3 of SP 800–30 
provides a high-level overview on the actual process and provides sub-tasks for each step 
[25]. The steps are subdivided into four areas. The first step is to prepare for the assessment, 
the second is to conduct the assessment, the third is to communicate the results and the 
fourth is the maintain the assessment [25]. Preparing for the assessment involves 
identifying the purpose, scope, assumptions, constraints, sources of information, risk 
model, and analytic approach for the assessment [25]. Conducting the assessment involves 
identifying the threat sources, threat events, and vulnerabilities [25]. Additionally, 
conducting the assessment involves determining the likelihood a threat would instigate a 
threat event, determine the adverse impacts on the organization, and finally determine the 
IS security risks. Communicating and sharing the risk assessment results is step 3, and is 
vital to sharing any information gathered from the assessment to members or entities across 
the organization with emphasis in supporting additional risk management scenarios [25]. 
Sharing the information can be accomplished by any number of ways. For example, an 
executive brief or distributing assessment reports should be shared with organizational 
stakeholders in accordance with organizational policy [25]. Finally, maintaining the 
assessment is step 4 in SP 800–30, and could be accomplished using a log for historical 
reference and continuity for future assessments [25].  
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Figure 11. Risk Assessment Process. Source: [25]. 
Chapter III describes the process of translating each of these diverse requirements 
into a CRMDM for sUAS CPS.  
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III. APPLYING NIST AND FIPS SECURITY STANDARDS
The purpose of a UAS risk assessment is to provide a level of awareness and input 
for commander’s the decision cycle. The assessment includes negative effects an adversary 
or natural phenomenon can introduce to UAS mission confidentiality, data integrity, and 
system availability. Once the potential threats are identified, a determination must be made 
as to the likelihood each threat could act on the UAS. Next, if the event occurs, determining 
the impact on the assets, individuals, component commands, or even the nation if the 
vulnerabilities were exploited [25]. Finally, the need to determine the overall sUAS 
cybersecurity risk assessment must be understood prior to system use, as is the case with 
any other operational or organizational risk management process.  
While there is no fully validated or commonly accepted equation that can be used 
to calculate cybersecurity risk, this work relies on a reasonable and systematic approach to 
calculating the overall risk assessment of UAS C2 and payload information that is 
represented by a concise general equation described below. For the UAS application, the 
equation involves input and action at the strategic, operational, and tactical tiers of the UAS 
cybersecurity life cycle. Although this paper is geared toward the tactical tier, it is 
imperative that each tier be addressed to achieve the best possible risk assessment and 
determination for utilizing the UAS in tactical missions. We assume that the qualitative, 
semi-quantitative, and risk descriptions discussed in NIST SP 800–30 [25] also apply to 
UAS CIA. 
UAS C2, payload information, and UAS CIA can be addressed using the SP 800–
30. The critical considerations required to perform an effective UAS cybersecurity risk
assessment are the threats, vulnerabilities, and potential impact suffered if the system is 
attacked. Ideally, UAS mission commanders would have pre-assigned values for each of 
these risk elements that could be referenced to assist in making go/no-go decisions. There 
are other methods to calculate cybersecurity risk, such as 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑥𝑥 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉 𝑥𝑥 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟, but there is no reduced vulnerability 
calculation  when either removing or mitigating the vulnerabilities [27].  
TO UAS
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A. CALCULATING UAS CYBERSECURITY RISK 
The NIST SP 800–30 generic risk model with key risk factors flow chart in Figure 
10 (above) implicitly represents an equation that can help determine the overall risk, or 
“organizational risk” [25]. Threats are categorized by an entity that can conduct a malicious 
event. Vulnerabilities have inherent severity levels that are outlined as “predisposing 
conditions,” these can be mitigated by removal or applying security controls [25]. 
Exploited vulnerabilities can cause adverse impacts with a certain degree of likelihood. 
Although it is not explicitly written in the NIST SP 800–30, it is implicitly shown in Figure 
10 that a relationship exists that can be used to determine the overall risk to the mission, 
assets, or personnel. This relationship can be expressed as an equation [25]:  
(1) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅 𝑥𝑥 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
 𝑥𝑥 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟
Optimally, if the strategic or operational commander requires UAS support as part 
of the mission, then some level of cybersecurity is required. Regional specific threat 
identification and analysis is necessary for each UAS operating area [28]. The ultimate 
goal, inspired by Defensive Cyberspace Operation concepts, is to reduce an attacker’s 
advantage by determining the overall cybersecurity risk and allowing tactical commanders 
the opportunity to understand the risks and make the appropriate risk-based decision (“go”, 
“no-go”, “go-despite-risk”) [28]. Knowing the potential threats, possible intent, and the 
targeting capabilities used in an attempt to disclose, deny, degrade, disrupt, or destroy 
information that affects operational success contributes to the cybersecurity risk 
management process. Additionally, knowing the range of potential effects from non-
adversarial threat sources can benefit the overall assessment and help select from available 
control measures.  
The threat characteristics model chosen for this study is outlined in Table 5 and the 
range of effects scale is shown in Table 6. If the UAS does not come with a valid Quick 
Look Vulnerability Assessment Report (Q-VAR) or NAVAIR Cyber Risk Assessment 
(CRA), then the overall UAS threat level selected will mimic the predicted impact level. 
These two scales will be tailored to fit the UAS CRMDM. 
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Table 5.    Characteristics of Adversary Capability. Source: [25]. 
Table 6.     Range of Effects for Non-adversarial Threat Sources. 
Source: [25]. 
UAS cybersecurity threat vectors relate to system vulnerabilities [25]. A sound 
assessment of each particular UAS is necessary to document known system vulnerabilities, 
weaknesses, and potential vectors for exploitation. Documenting and assessing the 
vulnerabilities and calculating the severity of each must be included in the risk assessment. 
POR UASs should come with a CRA or Q-VAR. UASs, especially smaller COTS systems, 
come with proprietary hardware and software that may render the vulnerability assessment 
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difficult and require more specialized assessments. Vulnerability, or red-team, testing is a 
proven methodology to determine if a particular UAS has vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities 
must be identified and mitigated with the results used as input for the equation prior to 
conducting the cybersecurity risk calculation, or the results will be inaccurate. Entities such 
as the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) Rogue Squadron and the Joint Vulnerabilities 
Assessment Branch (JVAB), under the authority of Naval Air Systems Command, may 
provide detailed assessments to the tactical teams. The UAV System Cyber-Security Threat 
Model [11] provides a generic outline of known possible UAS vulnerabilities based on 
laboratory studies and prior documented incidents. These vulnerabilities will be used as the 
vulnerability components in Equation 1. Additionally, as indicated in Equation 1, 
vulnerabilities are mitigated in one of two ways: removal or addressed using a competent 
security control. Reducing the vulnerability factor, or increasing the security control factor, 
are arguably the only components in the risk equation that can be manipulated by the 
system owner or operator. The vulnerability assessment scale chosen as a template for this 
study is outlined in Table 7. Table 7 does not offer an approach to assess the entire spectrum 
of vulnerabilities nor the myriad potential security control implementations. For example, 
it does not provide the correct value for a very high vulnerability that has a relevant security 
control fully implemented. This leaves too much interpretation with the tactical team and 
needs to be clarified for UAS assessments. The UAS CRMDM will address this challenge. 
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Table 7.      Vulnerability Severity. Source: [25]. 
The impact level shown in the risk assessment formula captures the characteristics 
of the threats that could adversely impact the mission, personnel, or equipment if exposed 
to a threat event [25]. The impact is a fixed numerical value that is assigned upon 
determining the level of impact that the unauthorized disclosure or compromise of any CIA 
component would have. The high water mark will be used to assign the correct impact 
value to the UAS, in the exact same way as assigned in FIPS 199 [22]. The impact 
assessment scale used in this research is shown in Table 8 below, which will be tailored to 
align with the CRMDM [25]. 
Table 8.   Likelihood of Threat Event Resulting in Adverse Impacts. 
Source: [25]. 
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The overall level of risk will be determined on a similar scale, and modified to 
facilitate a straight-forward calculation, as derived from the threat, vulnerability, and 
impact tables. The threat, vulnerability, and impact values will be calculated to create an 
overall risk value. During the risk determination, very low risk equates to negligible 
adverse effects for the mission, personnel, or equipment [25]. Low risk will yield limited 
adverse effects, moderate risk levels will begin to show serious effects, and high risk may 
produce catastrophic adverse effects on the mission, personnel, or equipment [25]. Finally, 
calculated risk in the very high range indicates the potential for multiple catastrophic 
failures impacting the mission [25]. The overall risk scale from SP 800-30 shows the 
qualitative and semi-quantitative values assigned to each risk level in Table 9. 
Table 9. Assessment Scale—Level of Risk. Source: [25]. 
The values listed in Tables 5 through 9 indicate two ways to calculate risk (e.g., 
qualitative, semi-quantitative). The calculation used in the CRMDM will calculate the 
semi-quantitative values to derive a qualitative value for each assessment. Transposing the 
accepted NIST IS descriptions and values will help forge the actual UAS CRMDM in the 
next section. 
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B. UAS CYBERSECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION MATRIX 
(CRMDM) 
The UAS CRMDM has been derived using the framework outlined in FIPS 199, 
FIPS 200, and NIST SP 800–30 using similar values and descriptions with slight 
modification. Three individual scales will be used to assess, calculate, and assign semi-
quantitative threat, vulnerability, and impact values used to produce an overall CRMDM 
risk score. The risk score will land on one of the four risk assessment zones. The zones will 
provide tactical commanders with a current cybersecurity risk snapshot that can be quickly 
communicated back up the operational and strategic chain-of-command. Once 
communicated, the appropriate commander would determine if the assessed UAS platform 
is a proper fit for the mission, if an alternative platform would yield a lower cybersecurity 
risk, or if the mission should not include sUAS at all. This determination would rest with 
the assigned Combatant Commander. Tailoring each scale into three logical matrices is the 
next logical step in the CRMDM creation. 
1. Threat Matrix
According to NIST SP 800–30, threats are “any circumstance or event with the 
potential to adversely impact organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 
organizations, or the Nation through an IS via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, 
or modification of information, and/or denial of service” [25]. Table 10 illustrates a 
proposed threat matrix that can be used by the strategic or operational staff intelligence 
cells for CRMDM applications. The table provides the threat value to the tactical teams for 
inclusion into the overall risk calculation. Friendly force intelligence must have an accurate 
threat assessment that is tangible and proven. If no threat assessment is available, then the 
impact scale will be used to drive the threat scale. For example, without the strategic or 
operational threat assessment, a mission that could result in certain adverse impacts would 
yield a semi-quantitative factor of 10 on impact and the equivalent score on the threat scale. 
The lower the impact score, the lower the overall threat score used for the overall risk 
determination. Each description and semi-quantitative factor in Table 10 is directly 
transposed from the associated SP 800–30 scale.  
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The overall qualitative values are the products of accurately assessed threats or 
driven by the impact matrix when no assessments are provided. Severe values result from 
a very sophisticated adversary, who is well funded, and has the opportunity, intent and 
capabilities to conduct multiple, successful, and continuous attacks. Such results would 
earn a semi-quantitative factor of 10 that would be used in the overall risk calculation at 
the end of the assessment. High qualitative values with a somewhat sophisticated level of 
capability, have resources available, and demonstrates intent to conduct multiple threat 
events would earn an 8 on the threat matrix factorial. Moderately experienced adversaries, 
with available resources, and the opportunity to support multiple attacks would yield a 5 
on the threat matrix. Finally, threats with limited expertise, resources, and opportunities to 
conduct multiple attacks on UAS earn a 2 on the threat matrix scale.  
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Table 10.     UAS CRMDM Threat Scale. Adapted from [25]. 







The regional adversary has a very sophisticated 
level of UAS exploitation expertise, is well 
resourced, and can generate opportunities to 
support multiple, successful, and continuous UAS 
CIA attacks. 
High 8 
The regional adversary has a sophisticated level of 
UAS exploitation expertise, with significant 
resources and opportunities to support multiple 
successful coordinated attacks. 
Moderate 5 
The adversary has moderate UAS exploitation 
expertise, resources and opportunities to support 
multiple successful attacks. 
Low 2 
The adversary has limited UAS exploitation 
expertise, resources and opportunities to support 
multiple successful attacks. 
While the language in the “Description” column relies heavily on the language in SP 800–30, the 
qualitative values deviate from SP 800–30 to reflect the same wording used at the strategic and 
operational level. 
The next factor in the overall risk equation is the vulnerability and security control 
component.  
2. Vulnerability and Security Control Matrix
Table 11 illustrates a concise UAS vulnerability scale and considers the availability 
of security controls to mitigate the overall vulnerability risk in the CDRMM equation. The 
vulnerability and security control matrix use the same semi-quantitative factor and 
description as seen in SP 800–30. The qualitative values deviate from SP 800–30 to 
produce four distinct categories versus five in the SP 800-30.  
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According to NIST SP 800–30, vulnerabilities are “a weakness in an information 
system, system security procedure, internal controls, or implementation that could be 
exploited by a threat source” [25]. The vulnerability matrix is the source of the 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉
 factor in the overall UAS risk assessment. This factor is the most operator, 
or blue force, influenced component in the entire UAS CRMDM. It is important to discuss 
the two methods of influencing the vulnerability factor. The first way is to completely 
remove the vulnerability, which would not require the use of a security control. The second 
method is to incorporate a tested security control to reduce the potential of an adversary 
exploiting the known vulnerability. NIST SP 800–53 lists a variety of tested security 
controls that can be leveraged to lower the semi-qualitative values.  
Vulnerabilities that are assessed to be in the severe category are openly exposed, 
exploitable, and could result in severe UAS impacts to confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability. Vulnerabilities in the high qualitative value are of high concern based on 
exposure, ease of exploitation, and the severity of potential impacts effecting the UAS CIA 
elements. Moderately assessed vulnerabilities are also of moderate concern based on their 
exposure, lower effort to exploit, and overall severity of CIA influencing factors. Low 
vulnerability threats are deemed of minor concern and have been mitigated. The only 
mitigations that can reduce severe, high and moderate vulnerabilities are to completely 
remove the vulnerability or fully implement proven security controls. The third and final 
factor in the risk equation is to determine the overall impact if the CIA was compromised. 
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Table 11.      UAS Vulnerability and Security Control Matrix.  
Adapted from [25]. 







The UAS vulnerability could result in severe impacts. 
Security Control (SC) Deduction: 
Fully implemented SC or vulnerability removed 
receives a semi-quantitative score of 2. 
High 8 
The UAS vulnerability is of high concern, based on the 
exposure of the vulnerability and ease of exploitation 
and/or on the severity of impacts that could result from 
its exploitation. 
Security Control (SC) Deduction: 
Fully implemented SC or vulnerability removed 
receives a semi-quantitative score of 2. 
Moderate 5 
The UAS vulnerability is of moderate concern, based 
on the exposure of the vulnerability and ease of 
exploitation and/or on the severity of impacts that could 
result from its exploitation. 
Security Control (SC) Deduction: 
Fully implemented SC or vulnerability removed 
receives a semi-quantitative score of 2. 
Low 2 
The UAS vulnerability is of minor or negligible 
concern.  
Security Control (SC) Deduction: 
Fully implemented SC or vulnerability removed 
receives a semi-quantitative score of 2. 
While the language in the “Description” column relies heavily on the language in SP 800–30, the qualitative 
values deviate from SP 800–30 to reflect the same wording used at the strategic and operational level. 
52 
3. Impact Matrix
As defined in SP 800–30, “the level of impact from a threat event is the magnitude 
of harm that can be expected to result from the consequences of unauthorized disclosure of 
information, unauthorized modification of information, unauthorized destruction of 
information, or loss of information or information system availability” [25]. The impact to 
UAS CIA exploitation can be shown via a straightforward metrics, as illustrated in 
Table 12, that can be correlated with the confidentiality of information flowing through the 
UAS, the impact to integrity of the information, or the overall availability of information 
produced by the UAS. The major requirement when determining the overall impact is 
critically assessing the level of damage that the unauthorized exposure, modification, or 
denial of UAS data or information could potentially impose on the mission, equipment, 
and personnel involved.  
Severe impact is impact that is almost certain to have adverse effects on the mission, 
equipment or personnel. High impact is highly likely to result in adverse impact. Moderate 
impact is somewhat likely to cause adverse effects and low impact determinations are 
assessed to be those that are unlikely to produce any adverse impacts. Two examples of 
impact factors include the ISR information classification level and the adversary’s 
knowledge that a UAS is active in a sensitive area. Impact calculations should take 
precedence when determining the threat semi-quantitative values in the absence of a threat 
assessment from higher authority. The mission impact is a reasonable substitute if the threat 
is unknown or capabilities are unclear.  
The last step is to calculate the overall risk score using the UAS CRMDM. 
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Table 12.      UAS Impact Matrix. Adapted from [25]. 







If the UAS threat event is initiated or occurs, it is 
almost certain to have adverse effects on the 
mission, equipment, or personnel. 
High 8 
If the UAS threat event is initiated or occurs, it is 
highly likely to have adverse effects on the mission, 
equipment, or personnel. 
Moderate 5 
If the UAS threat event is initiated or occurs, it is 
somewhat likely to have adverse effects on the 
mission, equipment, or personnel. 
Low 2 
If the UAS threat event is initiated or occurs, it is 
unlikely to have adverse effects on the mission, 
equipment, or personnel. 
While the language in the “Description” column relies heavily on the language in SP 800–30, some 
wording has been changed or added. 
4. Cybersecurity Risk Management Decision Matrix
According to NIST SP 800–30, “risk is a function of the likelihood of a threat 
event’s occurrence and potential adverse impact should the event occur” [25]. Risk 
associated with the unauthorized disclosure of UAS information, the loss of confidence in 
UAS information, or loss of the UAS itself are the major concerns of UAS risk-based 
assessments. Assessing each factor (i.e., threats, vulnerabilities, impacts) leads to an overall 
risk calculation that should be used prior to launch, and specifically during the selection of 
specific UAS platforms for each mission.  
Table 13 outlines the proposed UAS CRMDM that is adapted from NIST SP 800–
30. Each calculated value comes from multiplying the threat score, vulnerability (less
security control) score, and impact scores together. Severe risk overall equates to multiple 
severe or catastrophic adverse effects on the UAS mission, the UAS, personnel, supporting 
or supported commands, or the United States. Severe risk values (800–1,000) could be 
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expected to introduce multiple adverse effects [25]. High risk (500–640) indicates that a 
successful threat event could adversely or catastrophically impact the mission, asset, 
personnel, associated units, or the nation [25]. Moderate risk (250–400) indicates the 
potential risk to UAS operations could result in serious adverse effect on the mission, asset, 
personnel, units, or the United States [25]. Finally, low risk (8–200) equates to limited 
effects on the five aforementioned consumers or equipment during UAS operations [25].  
Table 13.     UAS Cybersecurity Risk Management Decision Matrix. 
Adapted from [25]. 
While the language in the “Description” column relies heavily on the language in SP 800–30, some 
wording has been changed or added. 







Severe risk means that a threat even could be 
expected to have multiple severe or catastrophic 
adverse effects on UAS operations, assets, 
individuals, other organizations, or the Nation. 
High 500-640 
High risk means that a threat event could be 
expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse 
effect on UAS operations, assets, individuals, other 
organizations, or the Nation. 
Moderate 250-400 
Moderate risk means that a threat event could be 
expected to have a serious adverse effect on UAS 
operations, assets, individuals, other organizations, 
or the Nation. 
Low 8 - 200 
Low risk means that a threat event could be 
expected to have a limited adverse effect on UAS 
operations, assets, individuals, other organizations, 
or the Nation. 
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A color-coded chart that uses the calculated UAS CRMDM score that facilitates an 
opportunity for decision makers to rapidly determine UAS safety of flight is illustrated in 
Table 14. The proposed UAS CRMDM Fly/No-Fly scale offers an efficient decision 
approach to commanders at all levels of operation. Table 13 was created using the 
combination of all possible values from the individual threat, vulnerability, and impact 
scores. This is only a proposed recommendation and it remains up to the tactical 
commander to accept the risks in context with the mission. Low-risk assessments shown 
in green on the fly/no-fly scale offer the largest footprint of opportunity. Tactical operators 
should mitigate vulnerabilities by removing them or implementing security controls. The 
moderate-risk scores are shown in yellow and represent more risk than green, but less than 
the high-risk represented in orange. Moderate-risk scores should only be used if the 
commander determines the benefits outweigh risks. High-risk scores should not be 
considered safe for operations and only used for absolutely necessary UAS. The high and 
severe risks will almost certainly produce a weakened or compromised CIA triad and yield 
devastating results. Severe risk scores should result in the decision process to consider 
alternate options or assets to conduct the mission. Severe risk is risk that cannot be 
mitigated and is highly likely to result in the loss of mission, equipment, or life.  
56 
Table 14.     Proposed UAS Cybersecurity Risk Management Decision 
Matrix Fly/No-Fly Scale. 
Having derived the UAS CRMDM from existing federal guidance applied to COTS 
UAS, the next phase in this study is to demonstrate its utility, provide some counter-
arguments, and explore its validity. This is done by comparing alternatives using a realistic 
scenario.   
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IV. CRMDM EXAMPLE AND ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF
ACTION (COA) ASSESSMENT 
The versatility of sUASs for military training, ISR, and combat applications reduces 
human exposure, provides unique surveillance perspectives, and sharpens tactical 
capabilities. In an age when threats reside in every domain, it is vital to reduce the risk to 
mission, protect limited assets, and provide a heightened level of safety for the operators. 
To meet these goals, advanced TTPs must be able to span multiple domains with emphasis 
on meeting the commander’s objectives through economy of force, security of assets, and 
safeguarding personnel. The UAS CRMDM should help provide the commander an 
opportunity to methodically assess available assets. Using the CRMDM in a fictitious, yet 
realistic, scenario will demonstrate its potential utility and provide face validity. 
Examining alternatives to the CRMDM will solidify the product of this effort and 
potentially justifies a tool in UAS missions that is long overdue. This chapter will offer 
three alternatives and a rebuttal to each. In the next section, the UAS CRMDM will be used 
in a step-by-step example. 
A. UAS CRMDM SCENARIO 
This section uses the proposed UAS CRMDM in a scenario to highlight its 
application in tactical, operational, and strategic UAS missions. The operational level UAS 
effort is currently being conducted by Major Gonzalo Santiago, United States Army, for 
his thesis titled “Cybersecurity Risk Management Process for Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS) Operation” [29]. The scenario takes the threat assessment from the operational 
commander and includes it in a UAS CRMDM to calculate overall risk. The calculation is 
returned to the operational commander to assess if the available UAS ISR assets should be 
used based on their cybersecurity risk assessment score.  
The current scenario is shown in Figure 12. One strategic commander, two 
operational commanders, and four tactical units are ordered to “defend national interests 
by defeating the current threat in all domains, deter and defeat any adversarial aggression, 
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effectively operate in cyberspace, and reduce risks to the operating forces in the Area of 
Operations (AOR)” [29].  
Figure 12. AOR Organization. Adapted from [29]. 
The operating environment is complex and a threat is identified that threatens the 
national interests [29]. The threat is capable of disrupting freedom of maneuver in 
cyberspace and indicates an increased level in violent extremist activities [29]. The 
extremists operate in small cells scattered throughout the AOR [29]. The cyber threat 
assessment is characterized as “a mid-level nation state actor with sophisticated 
understanding of advanced penetration techniques, is well-resourced, and intends to 
conduct cyber espionage to disrupt multiple organizations critical resources” [29]. 
Strategic Commander A provided tactical units AA and BB with the cyber threat 
assessment and an order to conduct a UAS risk assessment on available assets [29]. The 
threat assessment is illustrated in Table 15. 
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Table 15.     Scenario Problem Framing. Adapted from [29]. 
Tactical Units AA, BA, and BB provide ISR support with Group 1 and 2 UASs 
[29]. Only Units AA and BB are fully functional and each has a different type of small ISR 
UAS in the inventory. Unit AA is operating COTS Drone-A and it has a current NAVAIR 
Q-VAR on file. Unit BB is operating COTS Drone-B and also possesses a NAVAIR 
approved Q-VAR.  
Drone-A consists of a quadcopter airframe and a GCS laptop. The Drone-A ISR 
payload consists of a 1080p high-resolution camera, and the aircraft has a five-hour flight 
time. The drone possesses three vulnerabilities that are listed in the in the Q-VAR, two of 
which are mitigated by security controls. The first vulnerability is a forced login telnet 
authentication bypass, which is mitigated by installing vendor-supplied patches. The 
second vulnerability is an unprotected telnet service running on the aircraft. Filtering the 
media access card traffic and hiding the SSID mitigate both the first and second 
vulnerabilities. The third vulnerability is susceptibility to a deauthentication attack, which 
is not mitigated due to encryption not being available on the C2 software.  
Drone-B has three identified vulnerabilities. Drone-B is also a quadcopter airframe 
and only uses a handheld GCS that operates on C-band (4Ghz to 8 GHz) for C2 and uses 
Wi-Fi b/g/n standards for payload data. Drone-B has a 480p camera and has a three-hour 
flight time. The Wi-Fi is susceptible to eavesdropping; however, WPA2 encryption 
mitigates the risk. C-band C2 communications are prevalent in the AOR due to the large 
number of devices operating between 4–8Ghz. No mitigation is available for the loss of C2 
with Drone-B if the RF spectrum is saturated.  
A baseline RF assessment was completed by the UAS support element and it was 
determined that the RF spectrum was not saturated in the C-Band spectrum. No new RF 
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signatures were identified during the baseline and no additional threats were identified. Wi-
Fi traffic was assessed as average for the area and not anticipated to interfere with Wi-Fi 
based systems.  
The threat assessment puts the threat at an 8 (using Table 10), or high, due to the 
adversary’s sophisticated understanding, advanced penetration techniques, and abundant 
financial resources to conduct an attack. Drone-A has a known vulnerability that is of high 
concern due to the possible loss of mission critical confidentiality and availability, which 
also score an 8 on the vulnerability matrix (Table 11). Drone-B scored a 2 on the 
vulnerability assessment due to the assessed baseline and vulnerability mitigations. The 
impact assessment scored a 5 due to potential loss of equipment availability for both UASs. 
Both UASs do not store data onboard and adequate encryption is used to prevent the loss 
of confidentiality and compromised data integrity. Table 16 provides the assessed values 
of Drone-A and Table 17 shows the assessed values of Drone-B. Figure 13 illustrates where 
each drone landed on the UAS CRMDM Fly/No-Fly scale.  
Table 16.     Scenario Tactical UAS Drone-A CRMDM Results 
Tactical AA Drone-A Assessment 
Threat Vulnerability Impact Overall Risk Tactical Commander Notes 
8 8 5 320 
(Moderate) 
Requested platform despite 
higher threat assessment due to 
optical camera quality and 
increased endurance. 
Multiply the threat, vulnerability, and impact score to calculate the overall risk. 
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Table 17.      Scenario Tactical UAS Drone-B CRMDM Results 
Tactical BB Drone-B Assessment 
Threat Vulnerability Impact Overall Risk Tactical Commander Notes 
8 2 5 80 (Low) Requested as a secondary 
platform if Drone-A risk is not 
acceptable to the overall 
mission. 
Figure 13. Scenario UAS Cybersecurity Risk Management Decision 
Matrix Fly/No-Fly Scale. 
The UAS CRMDM is not a decisive directive, but it is a risk assessment tool that 
feeds the overall decision process. In this scenario, the higher-risk platform was requested 
as the primary platform due to two external factors, a better camera and longer endurance, 
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despite the higher risk assessment. The UAS CRMDM ensures that cybersecurity is 
incorporated into the decision cycle, but cybersecurity alone is not the ultimate decision 
authority.  
Both UAS CRMDM risk assessments were submitted up the chain of command for 
review and approval. The UAS teams are awaiting feedback and authority to operate the 
mission. The next section compares the past, present, and potential future COAs resulting 
from the existing UAS cybersecurity processes.  
B. ALTERNATIVES TO THE UAS CRMDM 
A sound method to explore the validity of this research is to discuss alternative 
COAs from other processes or procedures that are relevant and can address the thesis 
original thesis questions. The first element of the counter-arguments, also addressed by the 
thesis reasoning, is: What processes and considerations should a UAS CRMDM 
incorporate for tactical UAS commanders? The second element to consider, is:  what non-
UAS cybersecurity frameworks can be incorporated into the UAS CRMDM? Three 
alternative processes will be compared with the UAS CRMDM. The first alternative is to 
do nothing and not implement any processes that incorporate cybersecurity into the tactical 
UAS operation determination. The second COA is to continue with the current non-POR 
UAS exemption approval process. The final COA to examine is to completely halt the 
DoDs use of all UAS.  
1. Unrestricted Use of UAS without Cybersecurity
One alternative to the UAS CRMDM is to allow the unrestricted use of UAS 
without adopting a plan to mitigate cybersecurity threats on the systems. The time to assess 
cyber threat actors would be reduced at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This 
option would significantly increase speed of UAS deployment and substantially lighten the 
load on agencies conducting UAS Q-VARs and CRAs. More analysis time would be turned 
over to the individual units without the need for impact assessments. The immediate 
benefits would be quickly achieved, but the entire CIA spectrum would be left unassessed 
and potentially exploitable to the adversary’s advantage. 
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The DoD was operating UASs without an integrated UAS cybersecurity process, 
found the lack of a cybersecurity process unacceptable, and issued a general ban on the 
operation of all COTS UASs on May 23, 2018 [30]. The ban was followed by a UAS 
procurement and operational exception process on June 1, 2018 [30]. The COTS UAS 
procurement and operational ban is still in effect unless an approved exemption is reviewed 
and approved. The ban and exemption process demonstrate the DoDs desire to implement 
a top-down UAS cybersecurity process. Failing to implement cybersecurity provided 
adversaries with an open invitation to exploit critical United States DoD missions. The lack 
of a UAS cybersecurity process was deemed insupportable and put UASs at risk, which 
created the current non-POR UAS exemption process. 
2. Continue the Current Non-POR UAS Exemption Process
The second alternative COA is to continue using the agency specific non-POR UAS 
exemption approval process. Each service is permitted to create its own waiver process 
within specific bounds. The specific agency process for the Department of the Navy (DoN) 
illustrated in Figure 14 shows the current path required for all COTS DoN prior to approval 
to operate. The environment determination can flow in one of two ways; uncontrolled or 
controlled environments.  
All uncontrolled/benign, or operational, environment UAS operational waiver 
requests go directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) board. The board is 
held either bi-weekly or monthly to determine if a UAS waiver is granted or denied. For 
the DoD, controlled and benign environment requests are handled through the use of a 
consumer-completed questionnaire. The questionnaire provides Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) the opportunity to understand four key concepts considered 
cybersecurity. The first factor is the environment of which the UAS will operate. The 
second factor is the existence or type of C2 or payload encryption used on the subject UAS. 
The third factor covers the way data is stored either using real-time transmission to an off-
system location or if the data is stored onboard. The fourth factor is that all systems must 
be recovered and accounted for at the end of each event.  
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The Naval Waiver Board (NWB) consists of representatives from nine commands 
and is chaired by NAVAIR Cyber. The board includes; the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO); Department of the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (DASN RDT&E); the United 
States Marine Corps (USMC) for USMC requests; Naval Postgraduate School; Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N9I) for Navy requests, 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR); and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). The results and recommendations 
are briefed bi-weekly in an executive brief to the Under Secretary of the Navy and Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition where a waiver 
determination is approved, denied, or referred to OSD. 
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Figure 14. DoN Non-POR UAS Exemption Approval Process 
Counter-arguments to using the NWB are now presented. The NWB is not a 
solidified process, but is constantly evolving. The NWS is an extremely high-level short-
term fix to the DoD RMF, which is addressed in the proposed UAS CRMDM. If the NWB 
process is needed each time a command requires the use of UAS, then it could be at least 
two weeks before a waiver determination is complete. The UAS questionnaire is not listed 
as a component of the Uncontrolled Environment OSD board, which is arguably a higher 
risk environment.  It is unclear if the DoD RMF drives the operational risk assessment 
work-flow. The controlled and benign environment UAS questionnaire only addresses C2 
and payload confidentiality, the operating environment, data storage types, and recovery. 
The core principles of the DoD RMF include a six-step process that are all addressed in the 
streamlined UAS CRMDM. Categorizing the system is completed using the CIA trifecta. 
Vulnerability identification is completed, as well as security control selection and 
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implementation, using the RMF-centric Q-VAR and CRA processes by technical analysts. 
System risk analysis is conducted using a tailored NIST SP 800–30 semi-quantitative and 
qualitative scale. The scale is easily understandable and modifiable based on the level of 
risk the commander is willing or as directed by higher authority to accept. Willingness to 
accept risk is part of the DoD RMF, which is subsequently difficult when analyzing 
technology at the tactical level without the right tool [31]. The UAS CRMDM includes an 
assessment of non-adversarial threats into the calculus that are used to determine UAS 
vulnerabilities during extreme atmospheric or RF saturation. System and military unit-
specific standard operating procedures may provide additional guidance; however, the 
UAS CRMDM will also provide additional considerations for the overall risk. 
3. Abandon DoD Use of Commercial or Non-POR UAS
The final alternative COA examined is to completely abandon the use of 
commercial or non-POR UASs in the DoD. This is obviously not a wise decision, 
especially when considering the DoD allocated over $3 billion to purchase over 3,200 new 
UASs for 2019 [7]. Additionally, exposure and availability of manned assets providing 
real-time long-endurance ISR will never match the DoDs UAS ISR capability or flexibility. 
UASs help keep the warfighter safe by identifying hazardous conditions, IED locations, 
adversarial movements, and enemy postures without putting United States military lives 
out front first. 
The institution of the waiver process shortly after issuing the COTS UAS ban can 
be viewed as recognition that a total ban on COTS sUASs is impractical.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The need for cybersecurity has driven military organizations to develop processes 
and procedures that mitigate risk to their mission, equipment, and personnel while 
providing optimal functionality. Computing systems and devices that fail to incorporate 
TTPs designed to protect the CIA triad are subject to a challenging array of potential threats 
that may expose critical data, maliciously alter sensitive data, and significantly reduced 
system availability. This situation is ever present, regardless of the organization and IS.  
Generally, cybersecurity processes help protect IT assets that are, usually, 
physically safe due to location but still require risk assessment and mitigation to logically 
function when incorporated into globally shared networks. If wings were installed on a 
computer, it wirelessly transmitted critical information between the computer and a 
remote-control station, add a tactical operator in control, and introduce the new asset into 
adversary airspace, we would have, essentially, a UAS. Federally mandated frameworks 
were created to protect information, assets, and personnel using federal systems. DoD is 
now placing cybersecurity ownership at the command level by using the NIST and DoD 
RMF to mitigate risk and understand the subject system’s cybersecurity posture. All federal 
systems are mandated to incorporate the RMF into their cyber-system life cycle, which 
does not preclude UASs. It was only recently that UASs attracted attention due to 
discovered vulnerabilities, without appropriate security controls, that motivated senior 
leadership to act. Although the current NWP enables continued operations, it is not putting 
risk assessment techniques where they belong at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels. The proposed UAS CRMDM developed in this effort addresses this issue.  
The UAS CRMDM provides a cybersecurity decision support tool for use at the 
tactical level. The tool not only provides a process to assess various UASs suites, but also 
provides tactical commanders and operators a cybersecurity culture enabler relevant to 
other risks they already manage. The breadth of the UAS CRMDM is significant, as it 
addresses each pillar of the CIA triad and incorporates individual threat, vulnerability, and 
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impact assessments into a risk equation. This tailorable process can be adjusted or modified 
to give the tactical and operational decision makers the ability to understand what risks 
they are willing to accept and where the boundary exists for what risks they cannot accept. 
The straightforward calculations make the UAS CRMDM a useful utility when trying to 
determine the right platform, for the specific mission, under time constraints. The research 
presented here demonstrates that cybersecurity processes can be tailored to fit the highly 
relied upon, mission critical, and environmentally adaptable, UASs. An additional benefit 
is that the matrix can be used by personnel who are not cybersecurity experts. 
Even though the underlying risk model used as the basis for this work is not 
rigorously proven, it provides the foundation for a solid heuristic based process that would 
appear to be superior to any alternatives currently available, to enable the tactical operator 
to consider cybersecurity risk as an element of mission planning and execution. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Four specific needs were identified during the course of this study. The first is a 
supply-chain process that assesses UASs before acquisition. The need is apparent, since 
we still have cybersecurity issues with acquired COTS UASs. Processes and procedures 
are already in place with POR acquisitions; however, the need for incorporating a supply-
chain cybersecurity process does not only exist for POR systems, but should include COTS 
systems as well. Every level of the product life cycle should contain a process that helps 
mitigate and reduce unnecessary risk to the mission. One example of an effort that can 
support the supply-chain cybersecurity process is the Supply Chain Risk Analysis and 
Management System (SCRAMS) that was demonstrated by Strategic Mobility 21 
Incorporated during the Joint Interagency Field Experimentation 19–3 at Camp Roberts, 
CA, from April 29 through May 3, 2019. SCRAMS is a software suite that can identify 
risk factors such as fake system components, fraudulent shippers, unsuccessful 
manufacturers, or other user-defined risk factors.  
The second process that should be considered is a more rigorous validation of the 
UAS CRMDM. Providing this tool to a tactical unit would help flush out additional 
considerations and help the end-user fine-tune the process. Although an example scenario 
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is provided, it is important to validate the process with operating tactical units and adjust 
as necessary. Incorporating the culture of cybersecurity into tactical military units, faces 
barriers to acceptance, as with any organizational change; however, reliance on systems in 
the cyber domain depends on adequate processes to protect shared information and C2 
networks.  
The third future work consideration is the creation of a computer or portable device 
application that implements the CRMDM model. Such an application can allow the 
operator to conduct the UAS CRMDM and submit it to the tactical commander for 
incorporation into the decision cycle. Creating a simple, user-friendly step-by-step Android 
or IOS based application would offer the framework to the tactical consumer in a form that 
is similar to that used for other processes, such as organizational and operational risk 
management. Exploring these areas of future work would help determine how UASs can 
be used securely in a military context.  
The fourth, and final consideration is to systematically collect data on the 
performance of CRMDM model to adjust the performance of the general equation.  As 
previously stated, the equation used is neither supported by theory nor the result of any 
formal consensus. However, if a generally agreed upon equation for cybersecurity becomes 
available one should be able to easily incorporate the new model into the CRMDM, 
potentially improving its performance. 
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